Friday, March 08, 2013

If we see argumentation as the process of giving arguments, counter-arguments, counter-counter arguments and so on,  argumentation is like some sort of 'practical proof theory'.

If this is correct, what is the corresponding model theory?

Monday, March 04, 2013

Coping vs Resolving

This is a thought after reading Koji and Patrick draft on paraconsistent dynamics

When we have some evidence supporting and another evidence supporting : , sometimes we end up with neither believing nor believing : , but sometimes we end up with believing both and : . An example of the former case would be that one weather website predicts that today will rain, but another website predict that today will not rain. An example for inconsistent evidences leading to inconsistent beliefs might be that our evidences supporting Relativity and our evidences supporting Quantum Mechanism drive us to believe two mutually inconsistent theories. So, here might be questions worth considering:

* Conceptually/philosophically, can we specify conditions under which it is rational to form inconsistent beliefs, when we have conflicting evidences? Similarly, can we specify conditions under which it is rational to keep neutral, when we have conflicting evidences?

* If we can answer the previous conceptual questions, could we have an interesting formalization modeling this?

Monday, November 26, 2012

A good philosophical introduction book to probability

Probability: A Philosophical Introduction
D.H. Mellor

For a long term, I could not understand conditional probability: this book gives a very good explanation!

(I don't know why; but google can give you free PDF for this book.)

Saturday, June 09, 2012

How to generate a plausibility ordering via a justification structure?

One possible way might be to use argumentation systems!

1. Different extensions correspond to different degree of plausibility.
2. To get more discriminating among beliefs, employ the idea of the degree of conflict by Anthony Hunter.

Saturday, October 15, 2011

Where Is My Research Going

   The general theme of my thesis will be asking how to deal with inconsistent information in common sense reasoning.  So, two areas I will deal with are argumentation and belief revision.  By argumentation, I mean works by Anthony Hunter, John Pollock, Henry Prakken, Phan Minh Dung and many other authors.  It is more within the area of AI.

More specifically, I will focus on argumentation and its connection with belief revision.  So, for the belief revision part, I will use study in argumentation to do justification approach belief revision.  And, if it is within my ability, I also want to view all these things I have mentioned under the framework of epistemic logic.  So, I hope I can also deal with ‘dynamicizing’ justification logic in my thesis. 

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

two questions about LFI

  1. ΓAB(Γ, AA B) and
  2. ΓAB(Γ, oA, AA B

Q1: From a. and b., can we read out that ‘o’ mean ‘consistency’?

Q2: Let ‘o’ means consistency.  Do we have the intuition that b. holds?

Wednesday, August 24, 2011

[ZO] An Intuition

Let all other things be equal.
Then, the more inconsistent the information is,
the less conclusions we should draw from the information.